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	 Pattern	classification	model	 DR	 FAR	Calls		 Mathematical	formula	[24]	 80%		 3%	Calls		 Neural	networks	[15]	 50%		 0.02%	Calls		 RBF	neural	network	model	[2]	 97.5%	 4.2%	Mobility	 Bayes	decision	rule	[3]		 87.5%	 -	




















• Standard applications: provide a basic level of information on how a mobile user utilises the device, such as 
























Table 2: The MIT dataset 
 Standard apps Telephony  SMS 
participants 76 71 22 
unique apps/telephone numbers 101 2,317 1,381 
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  Location    Telephone number 
  
























Duration of call Negative 
Time of call Negative 






































neurons   EER 
1, 2, 3, 4 75   14.9% 
1, 2, 4 100   14.5% 
1, 2, 3 50   13% 
1, 2 75   10.5% 
Key: (1) Telephone No; (2) Location; (3) Duration; (4) Time 














neurons   EER 
1, 2, 3, 4 125   21.3% 
1, 2, 4 100   20.6% 
1, 2, 3 150   24.7% 
1, 2 150   17.5% 
Key: (1) Telephone No; (2) Location; (3) Duration; (4) Time 









Equation 1: Alarm if: 1 − #$$%&'($)	+,		-)'.%&)/0#$$%&'($)	+,		-)'.%&)/010234/23 5 ≥threshold 
Where: 
i=The features of one chosen application (e.g. dialled number for telephony application)  
x=The value of Featurei (e.g. office telephone number and home telephone number)  
M=Total number of values for Featurei 
N=Total number of features 






ployed   EER 
1, 2, 3, 4   20.1% 
1, 2, 4   12.4% 
1, 2, 3   19.7% 
1, 2   11% 
Key: (1) Telephone No; (2) Location; (3) Duration; (4) Time 









































Number of application entries 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Static 14 days 21.1% 17.4% 16.3% 14.9% 14.2% 13.6% 
Dynamic 14 days 21.1% 17.3% 16.0% 14.5% 14.0% 13.5% 
Dynamic 10 days 22.1% 17.8% 16.2% 14.6% 14.4% 13.7% 
Dynamic 7 days 24.0% 19.4% 17.6% 15.9% 15.3% 14.4% 
Table 7: Experimental results for standard applications 
 
Figure 3: FAR-FRR plot for standard applications with the dynamic 14 day profile 









Number of telephone call entries 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Static 14 days 9.6% 9.1% 7.9% 7.2% 4.3% 6.4% 
Dynamic 14 days 8.8% 8.1% 6.4% 6.4% 6.3% 5.4% 
Dynamic 10 days 9.6% 8.6% 8.1% 7.2% 6.9% 6.0% 
Dynamic 7 days 10.4% 8.8% 8.5% 7.3% 7.0% 6.2% 




















 Figure 4: FAR-FRR plot for the telephone call application with the dynamic 14 day 











Number of text message entries 
1 2 3 
 
Static 14 days 7.0% 4.3% 3.6% 
Dynamic 14 days 5.7% 2.6% 2.2% 
Dynamic 10 days 8.3% 4.1% 3.7% 
Dynamic 7 days 10.7% 5.7% 3.8% 
Table 9: Experimental results for the SMS application 
 
Figure 5: FAR-FRR plot for the SMS application with the dynamic 14 day profile with 























































Number of log entries 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
Static 14 days 16.9% 13.6% 12.7% 12% 10.9% 11% 
Dynamic  7 days 19 % 15.2% 13.1% 12.4% 11.3% 10.5% 
Dynamic 10 days 17.4% 13.7% 12.3% 11.6% 10.6% 9.8% 
Dynamic 14 days 16.5% 13.5% 12.1% 11.6% 10.5% 10.1% 
Table 10: Experimental results for multi-instance applications 
 
Figure 6: FAR-FRR plot for multi-instance applications with the dynamic 10 day pro-




























































Behavioural techniques EER 
Behaviour Profiling 10% 
Gait recognition [11] 20.1% 
Keystroke analysis [5] 13% 
Handwriting recognition [7] 1% 
Voice verification [32] 7.8% 









The concept of transparently authenticating mobile device users was first proposed by the Transpar-
ent Authentication System (TAS), which utilises a mixture of biometric techniques to verify a mobile 
user\textquoteright s identity in a continuous and transparent manner [4]. Based upon the foundation 
laid by TAS, the behaviour profiling framework employs the behaviour profiling approach to provide an 
enhanced security for the mobile device with minimum user inconvenience and the framework works 
in the following manner: 
• To improve the security for the mobile device beyond that offered by the password and token 
based approach;  
• To verify the user based upon their application usage in a continuous style;  
• To ensure the verification process is carried out in a user-friendly manner and that the user is main-
ly verified transparently rather than intrusively;  
• To provide an architecture that can operate in one of three modes based upon the desired output 
implementation: as a standalone security control, within an IDS system as a misuse detector or 
within a TAS.  
A number of process engines and a Security Manager have been devised to achieve these 
objectives (as illustrated in Figure 7). When a user utilises an application, details of the activ-
ity are automatically collected by a Data Collection Engine and then formulated into a behav-
ioural sample. A Behaviour Classification Engine compares the sample with a profile that is 
pre-generated by a Behaviour Profile Engine to determine the legitimacy of the user. Based 
upon the verification result, the Security Manager can make one of the following decisions 
according to the mode in which the framework operates: for the standalone mode, the Secu-
rity Manager individually handles the result and responses accordingly; otherwise, the Secu-
rity Manager forwards the result to a security management system (e.g. TAS) that makes 
any final decisions. A detailed description of this process is presented in the following sec-



















































































The main function of the Security Status Module is to maintain the System Security Status (SSS) level 
that constantly indicates how secure the system is. By utilising the SSS level, the framework can pro-
vide or deny access to the user accordingly. The SSS level is a numeric value in the range of -3 to 
+31: -3 indicates low security whilst +3 demonstrates high security; it is calculated based upon two 
critical factors: the performance factor of an application and the verification result. The performance 
factor is dynamically allocated to each application based upon their performance as demonstrated in 
Table 12.  














After the activity of an application is verified, a temporary value will be allocated based upon 
its performance factor. When a verification process involves more than one application, the 
temporary value will be obtained by combining the performance factor of each individual ap-
plication. Depending upon the verification result, the temporary value is then added to (veri-
fied successfully) or subtracted from (verified unsuccessfully) the existing SSS level to derive 
the current SSS level as shown in Figure 8. 
 
                                                
1 The boundaries defined on the numerical scale are only provided as a suggestion.  
Fig. 1. The SSS level calculation process 
\subsection{} 
 




The Security Manager is the brain of the framework as it co-operates with other elements to complete 
various tasks, including continuously verifying the user\textquoteright s identity, updating the perfor-





































 Request access for an Application
Is the application 
highly sensitive? 
Is the current SSS 
level smaller than -2?
Is the current SSS 
level less than 2? 
Is there any application not 
verified before requesting 
access on this application? 
Verify these 
applications and update 





Is Intrusive flag >2?Increase the current SSS level by 1
Set Intrusive flag=0 
Lock Device Request 
unlock code from an 
Administrator
Enter the unlock code
Set Intrusive flag=0,































When the framework works in the dependent mode, it can become a component for an au-
thentication security mechanism (e.g. TAS) or an IDS security mechanism (e.g. the 
Knowledge-based Temporal Abstraction (KBTA) method [25]) to complete these mecha-
nisms and enhance their ability and performance. Therefore, the Security Manager only pro-
vides a verification result and the final decision will be made by the other security mecha-
nisms. As a result, it would be difficult to evaluate the performance and impact of the frame-
work on other security mechanisms when it operates in the dependent mode.	
 
5 Evaluation  
In order to understand the effect that the framework has upon the overall performance, two 
aspects of the framework should be examined: the impact on the processing power and the 
effectiveness of authenticating the user. Regarding consumption of the processing power, 
previous research demonstrates that a complicated multimodal biometric authentication sys-
tem (i.e. TAS) was prototyped within the mobile environment and users were satisfied with 
their performance [8]. Therefore, it is envisaged that the proposed framework will have a 
small processing power footprint and little effect on the performance of the mobile device. 
For the performance of authentication, the framework was evaluated via a simulation pro-
cess which was conducted within the Matlab environment. The simulation system employed 
the same 76 users\textquoteright  4 weeks mobile activities which were utilised in section 3 
as the simulation data. For each user, their activities were divided into two halves, containing 
first and second two-week activities respectively. A user\textquoteright s profile was initially 
trained by utilising the first two-week worth of activities; with the profile then being updated 
on a daily basis. The rest of users\textquoteright  activities were employed to evaluate the 
performance of the Behaviour Profiling framework. Furthermore, due to the lack of sensitive 
application usage within this dataset, the text message application was selected as a sensi-
tive application in order to evaluate the effect upon the framework. During the chosen period, 
22 users utilised the text message application, representing 4.3% of the total application us-
age.   
As discussed in section 4, the performance of the framework can be influenced by three key 
parameters: the smoothing function, the verification time and the degradation function. 
Therefore, the evaluation sought to analyse the effect these parameters have upon the per-
formance. As such, four scenarios were set up to independently assess each parameter in 
turn, as illustrated in Table 13. Time periods for the degradation function were set between 
1-60 minutes with a 10-minute interval for all four scenarios.  
Table 13. Four scenarios for the simulation process 
Scenario A Smoothing function: 1 application; Verification time: NA 
Scenario B Smoothing function: 3 applications; Verification time: 3 minutes 
Scenario C Smoothing function: 3 applications; Verification time: 6 minutes 
Scenario D Smoothing function: 6 applications; Verification time: 6 minutes 
5.1 Simulation results  
The framework was configured according the setup in Table 13. Based upon the verification require-
ment of the Behaviour Classification Engine (in section 4), a user\textquoteright s application activity 
will be verified as soon as one application is utilised; therefore, the verification time is not applicable. 
The simulation results for scenario A are presented in Table 14.  






FRR FAR FRR FAR FRR FAR 
1 min 9.05 4.35 98.89 0 12.91 4.17 
10 mins 8.97 4.35 91.76 0 12.53 4.17 
20 mins 8.88 4.36 85.9 0 12.19 4.17 
30 mins 8.82 4.36 83.04 0 12.01 4.17 
40 mins 8.71 4.36 79.87 0 11.77 4.17 
50 mins 8.66 4.36 76.86 0 11.59 4.17 
60 mins 8.6 4.36 74.8 0 11.45 4.17 
In comparison with the configuration of scenario A, scenario B employed more applications 
for the smoothing function, allowing the smoothing function to work with up to 3 application 
activities. According to the verification requirements of the Behaviour Classification Engine, 
within the 3 minutes verification time window, applications will be processed when the total 
number being utilised reaches 3. Otherwise, any utilised applications will be verified even the 
total number of them is smaller than 3. Table 15 demonstrates the simulation results for sce-
nario B.  
Table 15 Simulation results of scenario B 
 Non-
sensitive aps 
Sensitive apps Overall apps 
FRR FAR FRR FAR FRR FAR 
1 min 8.05 3.41 100 15.29 13.06 4.07 
10 mins 7.87 3.42 94.28 15.29 12.53 4.08 
20 mins 7.75 3.42 88.8 15.29 12.08 4.08 
30 mins 7.72 3.42 85.95 15.29 11.88 4.08 
40 mins 7.64 3.42 81.89 15.29 11.58 4.08 
50 mins 7.62 3.42 78.57 15.29 11.38 4.09 
60 mins 7.57 3.42 77 15.29 11.24 4.09 
Based upon the setup of scenario B, scenario C utilised a longer verification time; this in-
creases the potential for allowing more application activities to be processed within one 
smoothing function. Based upon the requirement of the Behaviour Classification Engine, 
application activities will be classified as soon as the total number of them reaches 3 within 
the 6 minutes verification time window; when the 6 minutes verification time window is sur-
passed, even if the total number of application activities is smaller than 3, they will be pro-
cessed. Simulation results of scenario C are presented in Table 16.  
Table 16 Simulation results of scenario C 
 Non-sensitive 
apps 
Protected apps Overall apps 
FRR FAR FRR FAR FRR FAR 
1 min 7.96 2.45 100 26.39 13.3 3.95 
10 mins 7.83 2.46 96.23 26.39 12.89 3.96 
20 mins 7.66 2.46 90.64 26.39 12.36 3.96 
30 mins 7.63 2.46 87.8 26.39 12.15 3.96 
40 mins 7.54 2.47 84.07 26.39 11.79 3.96 
50 mins 7.51 2.47 80.85 26.39 11.58 3.97 
60 mins 7.45 2.47 79.26 26.39 11.43 3.97 
In comparison with the setup for scenario C, scenario D employed a higher number of appli-
cations for the smoothing function; this allows the smoothing function to potentially work with 
up to 6 application activities. According to the verification requirements for the Behaviour 
Classification Engine, within the 6 minutes verification time, application activities will be clas-
sified once there are 6 applications being utilised. When the 6 minutes verification time is 
exceeded, application activities will be processed by the Behaviour Classification Engine 
even though the total number of activities is less than 6. The simulation results for scenario 
D are presented in Table 17.  
 
Table 17 Simulation results of scenario D 
 Non-sensitive 
apps 
Protected apps Overall apps 
FRR FAR FRR FAR FRR FAR 
1 min 7.97 2.48 100 26.73 13.58 4.04 
10 mins 7.85 2.49 96.19 26.73 13.2 4.04 
20 mins 7.77 2.49 90.71 26.73 12.7 4.05 
30 mins 7.69 2.49 87.46 26.73 12.42 4.05 
40 mins 7.58 2.49 84.08 26.73 12.03 4.05 
50 mins 7.57 2.5 80.76 26.73 11.82 4.05 
60 mins 7.49 2.5 78.86 26.73 11.63 4.05 
5.2 Discussion  
In order to evaluate the performance of the framework, the most widely utilised PIN based technique 
was chosen as a baseline method. In order to maximise the security, it is assumed that a PIN is re-
quired after the mobile device has been idle for more than one minute. By utilising this setting, the PIN 
based method was applied to the same simulation data, requiring users to enter a PIN for every single 
application usage (0% transparent authentication). In comparison, taking scenario A as it is the most 
similar configuration to the PIN-based approach shows the Behaviour Profiling framework achieved 
an overall FRR of 11.45%, indicating that 88.55% of the time the legitimate user will be transparently 
verified and automatically obtain access to the device. With the same configuration, the imposter has 
only got a 4.17% chance to misuse an application and conversely 95.83% of the time they will be de-
nied access. It is worth noting the above simulation results did not include the intrusive stage of the 
authentication process. Therefore, in reality, it is highly likely that the imposter will be intrusively 
prompted with a randomly selected security question and hence the device will be locked down, re-
sulting in an improved overall FAR. Arguably, the Behaviour Profiling framework is capable of provid-
ing continuous and transparent protection for a good proportion of the time and is able to do so in a 
more secure and user convenient fashion.  
The smoothing function, verification time and degradation function are employed to justify 
the balance between the user\textquoteright s convenience and system security and their 
impact were also examined through the simulation scenarios. As demonstrated by the simu-
lation results (from Table 14-17), the best system performance (11.24% for overall FRR and 
4.09% for overall FAR) was obtained by utilising a combination of the smoothing function set 
to 3 applications, a verification time of 3 minutes and  degradation function of 60 minutes 
(scenario B). With other configurations, the overall system performance decreased slightly. 
What the simulation results have shown is the effect these parameters have upon the 
framework and the need to ensure they are set on an individual rather than population basis 
so that the system can be configured to optimally perform given an individual us-
















utilising a real user dataset in a set of scenarios, providing conclusive evidence that it can 
provide transparent identity verification a good proportion of the time - thereby outperforming 
traditional PIN-based authentication. However, the work is still required on improving the 
level of accuracy.  
 
Future work will focus into two directions. Firstly upon developing a fully functioning proto-
type of the proposed framework so that a series of studies examining the practical usability 
of the approach can be measured. Secondly to undertake a wide-spread data collection ac-
tivity so that a modern and relevant corpus of behavioural-based data exists from which al-
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